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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1542 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ERIC S. ANDERSON, 
 
                             Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1-11-cr-00030-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 4, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 25,2012 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Eric Anderson appeals from his judgment of sentence in the District of Delaware, 
challenging its procedural reasonableness.  We will affirm. 
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I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Anderson was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).  Anderson moved to suppress 
the firearm.  The District Court held a suppression hearing, and denied Anderson’s 
“colorable motion” by order and opinion.  Joint App. II at 69.  At Anderson’s change of 
plea hearing, the District Court accepted his plea agreement and his guilty plea. 
 The presentence report identified a base offense level of twenty.  Incorporating the 
terms of the plea agreement, the presentence report provided for a two-level reduction for 
affirmative acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), but did not 
provide for an additional one-level reduction for timely acceptance of responsibility 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).  The resulting total offense level of eighteen, combined 
with a criminal history category of four, yielded a Guidelines range of forty-one to fifty-
one months imprisonment.  Anderson did not object to the presentence report. 
 However, Anderson did submit a sentencing memorandum in which he argued for 
a downward variance based on his remorse and his loss of the third reduction point for 
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acceptance of responsibility due to his filing of the colorable motion to suppress.1
 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court first adopted the presentence report’s 
Guidelines calculation without objection.  Anderson then briefly referenced his loss of 
the third reduction point for acceptance of responsibility based on his filing of the 
colorable motion to suppress.  The District Court responded that it was “not sure that 
should factor into the calculus as to what ultimately the appropriate sentence is.”  Joint 
App. II at 69.  Anderson next argued at length about his remorse.  The District Court 
rejected Anderson’s request for a downward variance, and sentenced him to a within-
Guidelines term of forty-eight months imprisonment.  Anderson timely appealed. 
  
Anderson claimed that he was entitled to a below-Guidelines sentence of thirty-six 
months imprisonment.  The Government submitted a response letter arguing for a within-
Guidelines sentence of forty-eight months imprisonment. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction over this sentencing appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 
                                              
1 Anderson correctly labels his request as a downward variance rather than as a 
downward departure.  See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(en banc) (“[S]entencing departures . . . are based on specific Guidelines provisions, and 
sentencing variances . . . are based on the § 3553(a) factors.”).  Although Anderson 
requested a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range that would have applied had 
he received the full three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, he “d[id] not 
object to the Guideline calculations.”  Joint App. II at 53.  Instead, Anderson “request[ed] 
a sentence below the advisory guideline range . . . [in] compl[iance] with the statutory 
directives set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  Id. at 49. 
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U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s sentencing decision “to ensure that a 
substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.”  United 
States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).  We employ an abuse of discretion 
standard, United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)), reversing when a district court based its 
sentencing decision “on a clearly erroneous factual conclusion or an erroneous legal 
conclusion.”  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).  The appellant 
bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 
III. 
 On appeal, Anderson argues only that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, 
contending that the District Court erred by questioning its authority to grant a downward 
variance based on his remorse and his loss of the third reduction point for acceptance of 
responsibility due to his filing of the colorable motion to suppress.2
                                              
2 Although the plea agreement includes an appellate waiver, the waiver does not 
bar an appeal related to sentencing. 
  In support of his 
claim, Anderson points only to the District Court’s statement at his sentencing hearing 
that it was “not sure [his loss of the third reduction point for acceptance of responsibility 
based on his filing of the colorable motion to suppress] should factor into the calculus as 
to what ultimately the appropriate sentence is.”  Joint App. II at 69.  We find that the 
District Court was aware of its authority to grant Anderson a downward variance for his 
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acceptance of responsibility, exercised its discretion not to do so, and imposed a 
procedurally reasonable sentence. 
 A district court commits “significant procedural error” by “failing to calculate (or 
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, 
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous 
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an explanation for 
any deviation from the Guidelines range.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567 (quoting Gall, 552 
U.S. at 51).  We analyze a claim that a district court failed to recognize its authority to 
consider acceptance of responsibility as a sentencing factor as a claim that it committed 
significant procedural error by treating the Guidelines as mandatory.  See generally 
United States v. Severino, 454 F.3d 206, 210-14 (3d Cir. 2006).  We do not require a 
district court “to routinely state by rote that . . . [it] know[s] the sentencing guidelines are 
now advisory.”  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review 
the entire record, Severino, 454 F.3d at 211, rather than isolated statements, id. at 214, to 
determine whether a district court believed that it was bound by the Guidelines. Here, 
the District Court understood the advisory nature of the Guidelines.  At the change of 
plea hearing, the District Court explained to Anderson that it was “not required to follow” 
“the Guideline advice . . . about a sentence,” Gov’t App. at 18, and that it “retain[ed] the 
discretion . . . to sentence [him] . . . less severely than advised by the Guidelines.”  Id. at 
19.  Similarly, at the sentencing hearing, the District Court recognized that the Guidelines 
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were only one of “a number of factors that direct[ed] the exercise of [its] discretion in 
sentencing.”  Joint App. II at 86.  Notwithstanding the single ambiguous sentence 
Anderson highlights, we find that the record as a whole amply demonstrates that the 
District Court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory.  See Severino, 454 F.3d at 214 
(recognizing that “district judges issue sentencing decisions from the bench in 
‘spontaneous remarks’ that are ‘unlikely to be a perfect or complete statement of all of 
the surrounding law.’”) (quoting Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330 n.8).  Thus, we conclude that 
Anderson has not met his burden of demonstrating procedural error. 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s sentence. 
